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Abstract
The effectiveness ofﬁscal policy to inﬂuence vehicle purchases for emissions reductions in private
passenger road transport depends on its ability to incentivise consumers tomake choices oriented
towards lower emissions vehicles. However, car purchase choices are known to be strongly socially
determined, and this sector is highly diverse due to signiﬁcant socio-economic differences between
consumer groups. Here, we present a comprehensive dataset and analysis of the structure of the 2012
private passenger vehicle ﬂeet-years in sixmajor economies across theWorld (UK,USA, China, India,
Japan andBrazil) in terms of price, engine size and emissions distributions.We argue that choices and
aggregate elasticities of substitution can be predicted using this data, enabling us to evaluate the
effectiveness of potential ﬁscal and technological change policies onﬂeet-year emissions reductions.
We provide tools to do so based on the distributive structure of prices and emissions in segments of a
diversemarket, both for conventional as well as unconventional engine technologies.Weﬁnd that
markets differ signiﬁcantly between nations, and that correlations between engine sizes, emissions and
prices exist strongly in somemarkets and not strongly in others.We furthermore ﬁnd thatmarkets for
unconventional engine technologies have patchy coverages of varying levels. Theseﬁndings are
interpreted in terms of policy strategy.
1. Introduction
Road transport generates 5.3 Gt out of 31.7 Gt of CO2
of global fuel combustion greenhouse gas emissions
contributing to climate change, and over 30% of total
emissions annual growth (IEA 2013). The current
trend in global emissions is leading the world towards
global warming exceeding 4°C, with the most impor-
tant component emitted by the electricity sector,
transport coming second (IPCC 2014). Transport is
not currently highly regulated for emissions, and
consumer preferences with increasing income drives
choices towards increasingly carbon intense engines
(e.g. Gallachoir et al 2009, Zachariadis 2013)1. The
lack of clear policy direction in the sector may be
related to a lack of understanding of the impact of
policies aiming at incentivising consumer choice (He
andBandivadekar 2011).
The fuel efﬁciency of the car ﬂeet depends directly
on its composition of engine types and sizes. In other
emissions intensive sectors such as industry, technolo-
gies of the same type (e.g. boilers, blast furnaces,
power plants) differ modestly predominantly due to
vintage2. The transport sector, however, features a
very wide continuous array of possible fuel efﬁciencies
(spanning a factor of 3–4, see data below), that do not
depend as strongly on the state of technology and age
of cars as it does on socio-economic characteristics of
owners. As demonstrated byMcShane et al 2012, vehi-
cle choices strongly relate to social groups, and thus
existing socio-economic differences are reﬂected in
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the types of vehicles that consumers purchase, con-
sistent with socio-anthropological theory (Douglas
and Isherwood 1979). We ask two questions here: do
different markets respond differently to policy instru-
ments? Is it possible to obtain quantitative insight on
the effectiveness of proposed policies using market
researchmethods?
Cars typically survive in the ﬂeet for around 12
years3. The carbon intensity of the private vehicle ﬂeet
can be reduced by inﬂuencing vehicle purchase choi-
ces in two different ways4: by improving the average
fuel economy of the new ﬂeet-year (i.e. new models)
with conventional engine technology, or by gradually
replacing conventional combustion engines by hybrid
and electric systems. It is clear that comprehensive
emissions reduction policy must include coordinated
demand-pull and supply-push policies; however, in
the short term, it is policies affecting consumer choice
that have the most impact, since it takes years to
change production lines and supply chains of manu-
facturers, while sales can change overnight. Here, we
focus on demand-pull policies that affect consumer
choice.
Potentials for efﬁciency improvements in trans-
port have been widely explored (IPCC 2014,
WEC 2009, IEA 2012). In energy-environment policy
modelling research, ‘representative’ vehicles are most
of the time used, with cost-optimisation frameworks
(e.g. McCollum et al 2014; Takeshita 2012, van der
Zwaan et al 2013), a procedure that is, as we showhere,
insufﬁciently rich in socio-economic patterns, while
the optimisation of cost driving agent choice is contra-
dicted by empirical work (McShane et al 2012). It is
also not clear that evaluating the average willingness to
pay for higher fuel efﬁciency is feasible or even insight-
ful in a highly diverse sector where prices span an
order of magnitude following the income distribution
(see below), and the literature is not unanimous on
any value (Greene 2010, Anderson and Kellogg 2011,
Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011). A more promising
approach appears to be to use marketing research,
where the likely response of consumers to policies is
inferred from the structure of the market itself (as in
He and Bandivadekar 2011), and this approach natu-
rally introduces socio-economic distributions.
In this paper, we explore the emissions, technical
and economical characteristics and potential for emis-
sions reductions of car markets in six major repre-
sentative economies of the World: the United
Kingdom, the United States, China, India, Japan and
Brazil. These markets possess very different character-
istics that are the result of different histories of policy
and regulations, but also different socio-economic
characteristics of their populations as well as different
cultures.We show that, evenwith highly globalised car
manufacturers, the distribution of car purchases and
their fuel efﬁciencies have radically different char-
acteristics in different markets. We calculate the effec-
tiveness of emissions reduction policies through
vehicle choice in terms of emissions reductions per
unit tax, applied on the price of vehicles or fuels. This
is compared to the effectiveness of policy for technolo-
gical change. This leads to two considerations: ﬁrstly,
different carmarkets may require different policies for
effective emissions reductions. Secondly, differences
in market characteristics between countries show
comparatively what may be realistically achievable
elsewhere with policy. Details of calculations are given
in the supplementary information (SI) available at
stacks.iop.org/erl/10/064008/mmedia.
2.Materials andmethods
2.1. Theory for car purchase choice
McShane et al 2012 makes a remarkable demonstra-
tion, using correlations spatially resolved using post-
code data, that vehicle purchases in the USA are
visually inﬂuenced by previous purchases of similar
vehicles locally, but not by purchases that happen at
distances where visual inﬂuence is weak. This takes
place within geographical areas, social identity groups,
and within vehicle types and price tiers. This work
provides strong evidence of how vehicle choices,
determined within social groups, take place within
Figure 1.Comparison between theUK income distribution
in kUSD/year after tax (obtained fromUKDWP2013) and
the distribution of vehicle prices after tax for vehicles
purchased in theUK in 2012 (this study, using data from
DVLA2012 andCar Pages 2012, see section 3). The vehicle
price distribution population (the y scaling) is scaled by a per
capita vehicle ownership factor of 0.44 (to convert units
between per vehicle owner and per capita), which corre-
sponds to about 28.3million vehicles owned by 63.9million
persons in 2012 (DVLA 2012). The two distributions are
likely connected.
3
The life expectancy of cars in the UK is 12 years, as calculated by
the authors using a survival analysis with data from the DVLA 2012
data, unpublished.
4
Emissions can also be reduced by reductions of car use, for instance
with fuel taxes, involving possible transport mode or lifestyle
changes, not the subject of this paper.
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restricted subsets the vehicle market in speciﬁc price
segments.
This can be directly observed using socio-eco-
nomic distribution data. Figure 1 shows the 2012 dis-
tribution of income for the whole UK population
(from UKDWP 2013), along with the 2012 UK dis-
tribution of car purchase prices (this work, see below)
multiplied by average car ownership. Both datasets are
well described by lognormal distributions and a close
relationship is observed between their scaling para-
meters5, suggesting a likely proportional relationship.
This indicates that particular socio-economic groups,
on average, purchase vehicles of similar prices6.
Based on this evidence, here we infer that car buy-
ers seek to display their social identity, and thus social
group characteristics, when purchasing a vehicle, an
assertion supported by socio-anthropological theory
(the anthropology of consumption, seminal work by
Douglas and Isherwood 1979), principles generally
accepted in marketing research. Following the reason-
ing of Douglas and Isherwood 1979, while all passen-
ger vehicles are built for the purpose of transporting
persons, they aremarketed for particular social groups
at particular prices that match their willingness to pay,
and these prices also restrict access to other social
groups. The price one is able to pay for a vehicle may
be a particularly important channel for the commu-
nication of one’s social identity, and, as emerges from
ﬁgure 1, appears to be a good indicator of one’s dis-
posable income.
The diversity of social groups within a nation
therefore strongly inﬂuences the diffusion of innova-
tions in the private transport ﬂeet. Formally, the
breadth of consumer diversity determines the elasticities
of technology substitution, an assertion that is best
understood using discrete choice theory (for instance
inBen-Akiva and Lerman 1985). This assertion is con-
sistent with classical diffusion theory (Rogers 2010), in
which the diversity of consumers determine the scal-
ing of the typical S-shaped proﬁle of diffusion. It also
follows from evolutionary economics, where technol-
ogy diversity continually increases to ever bettermatch
evolving consumer tastes.
2.2. Theory for evaluating the effectiveness of policy
Emissions reduction policies targeting private vehicle
choices have an effectiveness that depends on the
structure of local vehicle markets7. Intuitively, one
expects that fuel efﬁciencies decrease with increasing
levels of luxury. As we ﬁnd here, however, prices do
not always scale with emissions, andwe describe below
the implications to the response of consumers to
policy-making.
Vehicleswith large engine displacements have in gen-
eral higher torque and power (for a review of data see
WEC2009). For this enhancedpower,more fuel (energy)
is used and therefore, for any carbon-based fuel, higher
power means higher emissions per kilometre travelled8.
We explore this relationship below; even though sig-
niﬁcant amounts of energy may be used in vehicles for
other purposes than movement (e.g. air conditioning,
electronics), we ﬁnd that a relationship between emis-
sions and engine size is alwaysmeasurable, and it is linear.
Vehicles with larger engine displacements are gen-
erally thought more luxurious and expensive than
vehicles with small economical engines. This, how-
ever, is not always true and, as we ﬁnd below, depends
on particular vehicle markets. As we show below,
when it exists, it is log-linear9. Therefore, whether
emissions, or the fuel economy, are functionally rela-
ted in any particular waywith vehicle price depends on
these two relationships: between emissions and engine
size, and between engine size and price.When it exists,
it is also of the log-linear type.
The effectiveness of taxes or subsidies applied on
vehicle properties such as engine size or emissions cor-
responds to their ability to generate substitutions
between available vehicle models in order to achieve
reductions in the emissions of new vehicles. We show
here that at the aggregate level, the effectiveness
depends on the structure of the market and on whe-
ther a relationship between emissions and price exists.
If a relationship exists, the effectiveness is closely rela-
ted to its correlation parameters. If no relationship
exists, the aggregate outcome of ﬁscal policies may or
may not turn out to match what was expected in their
design, and high levels of uncertainty remains. Given
the log-linear structure of the market, an emissions
reduction tax on the purchase price that produces a
non-negligible incentive across the spectrum of vehi-
cles requires a fee that increases at least proportionally
to the emissions rating. When proportional, it is con-
sistent with the ‘polluter pays’ principle. Note, how-
ever, that with ﬁscal policies based on the polluter pays
principle, according to our data, the incentive com-
paratively decreases with increasing car price10. The
5
The ratio between their mean and their standard deviation or
median is nearly the same.
6
Note that the strength of this correlation and its scaling is found to
vary across the world, where in some countries, the importance of
vehicle purchases relative to other expenditures differ. In particular,
in Japan, the car is losing its signiﬁcance as an identity symbol and
expenditure, and the relationship between income and vehicle price
is comparatively weakened (see the data in JAMA2013).
7
By this we mean markets for new vehicles, since the sale of second
hand vehicles does not change ﬂeet emissions, unless they are
scrapped before the end of their statistical lifetime, e.g. with a
dedicated scrapping policy.
8
Two aspects of driving behaviour predominantly underlie a
demand for higher power. For the same travel itinerary, (1) higher
constant speeds (wind resistance increases faster than linearly with
speed, which thus requires more energy per kilometre the faster the
vehicle travels). (2) Higher acceleration (requires more energy since
energy losses are proportionally higher at higher engine revolutions
required for higher acceleration).
9
The log of the price is a linear function of engine size.
10
Car prices increase exponentially for corresponding emissions
that increase linearly. At high car prices, emissions taxes become
comparatively small.
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effect of taxes on the price of fuels to the choice of vehi-
cles is technically very similar to that of taxes on rated
emissions, since the consumer, at purchase time, can
only at best estimate future fuel cost using manu-
facturer rated emissions. Thus we treat them in the
same way here. Estimating their effectiveness however
requires extra knowledge, or assumptions, on the
extent to which consumers evaluate and take con-
sideration of fuel costs over the vehicle’s lifetime in
their purchasing decisions.
The effectiveness of policy in a diverse market is
explained schematically in ﬁgures 2(a) and (b), in
which two ﬁctitious vehicle markets are illustrated
using one circle per vehicle model, of which the area
scales with its number of sales. In a., we have a market
where exponentially more expensive vehicles have on
average proportionally higher fuel consumption.
Applying a ﬁscal policy based on engine sizes or rated
emissions is likely to lead to some emissions reduc-
tions if consumers, when replacing a vehicle, attempt
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the effectiveness ofﬁscal policies based on emissions in the case where there is (a.) a strong
correlation between emissions and vehicle price andwhere (b.) there is no clear correlation. Blue lines represent linear regressions.
With a tax that depends on rated emissions (not necessarily proportional), points in the graph aremoved to the left (purple arrows).
Possible reactions of consumers changing vehicle choice in order to counteract price changes are suggestedwith green arrows. In (c.)
we illustrate the effectiveness of technological change policies given of a ﬁctitious alternative technologywith limitedmarket coverage,
where a subsidy is applied.
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to remainwithin a particular price bracket, as thework
of McShane et al 2012 suggests they would. By seeking
a price reduction to compensate for the tax, con-
sumers are forced by available choice to pick in almost
every case lower emissions vehicles. In this case the
policy effectiveness is well deﬁned, and is equal to the
slope of the relationship. Note that this effect also
works in reverse: if their income increases, consumers
may seek higher price vehicles, which in turn would
have higher emissions. Note also that the effectiveness
value is independent of the shape of the chosen rela-
tion between the tax value and rated emissions (i.e.
proportional or not)11.
In b., we have a situation where no correlation
exists between emissions and price. In this case, the
aggregate impact of a ﬁscal policy on emissions is
ambiguous and could lead to uncertain changes in
emissions. This is because there is a wide range of pos-
sible fuel economy values that consumers can access
while attempting to choose lower price vehicles to
compensate for the tax. In this case the policy effec-
tiveness is itself ambiguous. Insight on the effective-
ness of policy can thus be obtained from a
combination of the strength of the correlation
between prices and emissions (the level of conﬁdence
that a response to the policy would arise), and the
slope of the relationship itself (the strength of the
response).
Meanwhile, emissions can also be inﬂuenced using
policies supporting changes in engine technologies,
such hybrid or electric. Technological change could
effectively reduce emissions if alternative engine vehi-
cle models have very low emissions and if they are
accessible to most consumers. Currently, however,
(see below) most markets do not offer a very wide
range of models, which may not have the ability to
capture the whole breadth of existing consumer
diversity, restricting their diffusion. The effectiveness
of subsidies will be determined by whether they help
better match new technologies to consumer tastes in
market segments where they can be made attractive.
This is depicted schematically in panel c., where
hypothetical price distributed sales for an alternative
technology are shown (in red) along with a typical
sales distribution of conventional vehicles. The range
of the market that can be expected to be affected by a
policy, according to McShane et al 2012, is a restric-
ted segment of the whole market. A subsidy policy
changes the market segment in which the technology
is beingmarketed. This restricted effectiveness can be
altered in the future if manufacturers succeed in
broadening market choice in order to cover more
social identity groups.
Finally, we may ask, is the analysis of the impact of
a tax on the price of fuels conceptually any different to
that for a tax on the price of vehicles proportional to
emissions? There is considerable controversy on how
buyers of new vehicles take consideration of fuel costs
when taking a decision (e.g. Busse et al 2013,
OECD 2010). In the consumer’s perspective, a fuel tax
applies later in time than a tax on vehicle prices. There
is no clear evidence to support a claim that high emis-
sions vehicles are scrapped more quickly in situations
of a high tax on fuels; it mostly changes their trading
value in second hand markets, but they likely remain
in the ﬂeet (Busse et al 2013). There is evidence that
fuel taxes lead to reductions of car use and associated
emissions (Busse et al 2013), which originates from
changes in lifestyles, transport modes, load factors and
economic impacts, but this subject is outside of the
scope of the present paper, which focuses on con-
sumer choices for new vehicles. Thus for our pur-
poses, for a similar tax value, a fuel tax inﬂuences the
choice of new vehicles in a similar way as a registration
tax proportional to emissions.
The extent to which consumers consider fuel costs
when choosing a vehicle can be expressed by how
much they discount future fuel costs, and the discount
rate expresses their time preference. The literature
reports values from around 5–10% (Busse et al 2013)
to 20, even 40% (OECD 2010), depending how the
measurement is done. We show in the SI that ﬂeet
averaged lifetime fuel costs are most of the time much
lower than ﬂeet averaged car prices. The effectiveness
of a tax on fuels, per percent of tax applied, is pro-
portionally lower than a tax on car prices proportional
to emissions, by the proportion that fuel costs make in
the total cost, which partly depends on the discount
rate chosen. Calculations using various rates are given
in the SI.
Vehicle markets, policy and consumer choices
co-evolve with time (e.g. Geels 2006). It is thus
understood that the analysis presented is a present
day picture which will evolve as manufacturers,
consumers and policies co-evolve. While the mar-
ket structure will likely change, the short term
analysis approach proposed here should remain
valid.
2.3. Calculating the effectiveness of aﬁscal policy
Given comprehensive market data, the likely effective-
ness of a ﬁscal policy given above can be calculated
using a regression. However, more detailed insight
may be obtained with a model of distributed choice
dynamics. We assume, as in the above, that when
imposing a new tax on the purchase of vehicles based
on emissions, the response of consumers will be to
compensate the tax with a lower vehicle cost. We
deﬁne a symmetric probability distribution (in log
scale) f P P T(ln ln ln , )i j j σ− + , that determines the
approximate region in the E P( , ln ) plane where they
search the market. Pi is the price of vehicles i
considered before the tax comes into force, Pj is the
price of vehicles j that consumers decide to purchase
11
Pigouvian and fuel taxes are proportional to emissions, but other
relationships, e.g. exponential, could also be used.
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instead once the tax comes into force, however with-
out the tax included, and r T 1j j= − is the vehicle
dependent tax rate applied on models j based on their
rated emissions Ej. σ is the tolerance of consumers to
price differences, as a fraction of price, that we assume
within 5–20%. Following McShane et al 2012, con-
sumers who would, before the tax, have purchased
vehicle model i, their probability of choosing model j
instead will be proportional to the relative popularity
ofmodel j, (it’s number of salesNj):
( )N f P P T
N f P P T
ln ln ln
( ln ln ln )
. (1)i j
j i j j
k k i k k
 ∑=
− +
− +→
Before the tax was applied, Ni consumers per unit
time purchased model i. After the tax is applied, these
consumers will most likely purchase other models
instead, while other consumers from another price tier
will purchase model i. Since there were Ni consumers
initially considering model i, the number of con-
sumers changing their choice from i to j is thus
N N N
f P P T
N f P P T
t
( ln ln ln )
( ln ln ln )
.
(2)
i j i j
i k k
k k i k k
∑Δ Δ=
− +
− +→
Consumers who would have purchased model j also
have a non-zero probability of purchasing model i12,
Nj iΔ → . The number of changes of choices between
model i and j is
N N N
N N g T g T t
,
( ln ) ( ln ) , (3)
ij i j j i
i j ij i ji i
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
Δ Δ Δ
Δ
= −
= −
→ →
g T
f P P T
N f P P T
( ln )
( ln ln ln )
( ln ln ln )
. (4)ij i
i k k
k k i k k
∑=
− +
− +
A new set of vehicle sales when the tax applies can be
calculated using N N
j ij i
∑ Δ + . Here, we are inter-
ested in calculating the average emissions change
related to these change of choices.We therefore add up
each choice change’s impact on total ﬂeet-year emis-
sions:
E
N
E N N N
1
, , (5)
ij
j ij
i
i
tot
tot∑ ∑Δ Δ= =
The cumulative amount of registration tax applied
and paid associated to new choices is calculated differ-
ently since the tax value is zero before the tax is
applied:
( )T
N
N N Tln
1
ln . (6)
ij
ij i j
tot
∑ Δ= +
Tln is approximately equal to an average tax rate
r between zero and one. The value obtained from the
ratio E TlnΔ gives the weighted average emissions
reductions per unit of average tax paid that result from
consumer choice13.
The breadth of the variations between individual
choices and the average E TlnΔ is obtained using
E E E2 2δΔ Δ Δ= 〈 〉 − 〈 〉 , where 〈〉 indicates a popula-
tion weighted average14. This may be interpreted as an
uncertainty range; however note that it actually corre-
sponds to the standard deviation of a known distribu-
tion of individual behaviour, while EΔ is its mean,
with signiﬁcant amounts of variations cancelling in the
aggregate. The same calculation is done for engine
sizes SΔ .
3.Data and results
Sales for new private passenger vehicles were obtained
from Marklines 2014 for all six countries except the
UK, for which a more detailed dataset was used for
new vehicle registrations from the registration agency
DVLA 2012. Entries were matched, model by model,
to various data sources, all commercial websites, for
vehicle price, engine size and rated emissions: (Car
Pages 2012) (UK), AutoUSA.com 2013 (USA),
SohuAuto 2014 and CarWale 2013 (India), Zig-
wheels 2013 and AutoHome 2014 (China), and
individual car maker websites. For almost all models
matched, we thus obtained their price, rated emis-
sions, engine size and the number sold from the
combination of only two data sources by model,
enabling to look for correlations. We matched in this
way over 4200models across the six nations15.
Prices were converted from local currencies to US
dollars using www.XE.com (June 2014). Rated emis-
sions and engine sizes are those given by the manu-
facturers. Marklines 2014 numbers were checked for
reliability against total sales given by a number of ofﬁ-
cial data sources, and proved to be reliable. We stress
that Marklines data are comprehensive in these coun-
tries, not samples. Variations of prices for particular
models related to optional features were found to
remain most of the time within about 5–20% of the
basic model prices, providing a rough basis for the
value of σ.
Figure 3 shows distributions of private passenger
vehicle prices on linear price axes for 2012 registra-
tions in our six major economies. Sales of alternative
12
Especially if the taxwas negative, i.e. a subsidy; this equationmust
be symmetric under changes of sign of Tln i .
13
E.g. if E TlnΔ = 40 gCO2 km−1, then for a 10% average tax one
obtainsmean emissions reductions of 4 gCO2 km
−1.
14
We considered that variations on Tln are the same as those on
EΔ , since the relationship between emissions and tax is exact, and
thus this uncertainty is not double-counted.
15
2212 in the UK, 470 in the USA, 630 in China, 188 in India, 455 in
Japan, 335 in Brazil. All data sets cover all types of private passenger
vehicles with 4 wheels (i.e. we excluded buses and motorcycles).
Where numbers of models are higher, such as in the UK, more
variants of similar models were included. In the UK, the DVLA 2012
database for new registrations has over 29 000 entries, featuring large
numbers of entry variants of similar or identical models. In the UK
the matching was restricted to entries with sales of more than 100
units, however for other countries, allMarklines datawas used.
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technologies, hybrid and electric cars, are shown in
pink and red respectively, scaled up for legibility. All
graphs have identical abscissa scaling and binning for
comparison. All distributions can be parameterised by
log-normal distributions16. We provide average and
median prices with their standard deviations in table 1.
The distributions of emissions and engine sizes for the
same data are also shown in ﬁgure 3, with engine sizes
in the insets. Average and median emissions and
engine sizes, with their standard deviations, are given
in table 1.
Scatter plots with linear univariate correlations
between engine sizes and the logarithm of vehicle pri-
ces are shown in the left hand panels of ﬁgures 4 and 5.
The same is given for emissions and engine sizes, mid-
dle panels, and for emissions and the logarithm of pri-
ces, in the right hand panels. In these bubble graphs,
one circle is shown per model, of which the area is
scaled with the root of the number of sales17. The same
Figure 3.Top two rows: price distributions of 2012 vehicle sales for six countries on linear price axes with identical price scaling. Price
distributions of alternative engine technology vehicles are shown in pink (hybrid) and red (electric),multiplied by the amounts
indicated in the legends for legibility.Bottom two rows: emissions distributions (main graphs) and engine size distributions (insets) of
2012 vehicle sales for six countries on linear emissions and engine size axes with identical scaling. Similar distributions of hybrid
engine technology vehicles are shown in pink,multiplied by the amounts indicated in the legends for legibility (electric cars have no
engine displacements or tailpipe emissions).
16
This was determined by both binning the distributions on a log
axis and observing distributions that are roughly normal, and by
ﬁtting non-linearly log-normal distributions to the data with linear
binning, not shownhere.
17
The root was used for illustrative purposes, to increase the
visibility of less popular models and to limit the area of circles for
popular models. This enabled the same scaling to be used in all
graphs.
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circle size scaling was used in all graphs. Lines are
population weighted linear ﬁts of two variables, with
coefﬁcients of determination R2 indicated (all para-
meters given in table 2).We did not assume that emis-
sions were correlated with engine sizes and prices
simultaneously (the regressions are not multivariate);
instead we considered that emissions depend on vehi-
cle prices exclusively through the relationship between
emissions and engine sizes. Uncertainty values on
regressions were obtained using a Monte-Carlo
method (details in the SI).
Table 2 gives correlations parameters and effec-
tiveness values ( E TlnΔ ) calculated using equations 5
and 6, for both types of vehicle tax schemes based
either on emissions or engine sizes. The effectiveness
values per unit of average tax paid were calculated
using three values of consumer tolerance to price
changes σ, with uncertainty, over a range of 42 tax
Table 1.Properties of vehicleﬂeets for six representative countries. This includes average (Avg),
median (Med) and standard deviations (Std) of prices, engine sizes and emissions. Price distribu-
tions arewell described by log-normal, and thus theirmedians are lower than themeans.
Fleet distribution properties
UK USA China India Japan Brazil
Avg 34285 25959 22826 8674 18317 20642
P (USD) Med 31520 23871 18970 6947 14968 16425
Std 18640 10570 16633 12418 11526 13770
Avg 1576 3026 1704 1220 1286 1527
S (cc) Med 1498 2550 1596 1170 1252 1558
Std 544 1225 481 445 728 458
Avg 123.3 185.4 154.1 140.4 113.4 112.2
E (g km−1) Med 118.8 175.6 152.5 145.0 102.2 105.6
Std 30.1 50.3 30.6 26.6 44.3 28.5
Figure 4.Populationweighted univariate regressions between variables for theUK,USA andChina. Left column: engine sizes against
the logarithmof vehicle prices.Middle column: emissions against engine sizes.Right column: emissions against the logarithmof vehicle
prices.
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schemes proportional with values of between−3kUSD
up to 20kUSD at 300 gCO2 km
−1, for taxes on emis-
sions, and between −3 and 20kUSD cc−1 at 5000cc for
taxes on engine sizes. The negative ranges were inclu-
ded to test whether negative taxes lead to higher emis-
sions, which effectively leads to the same but negative
effectiveness values (see details in the SI). This indi-
cates that increases in relative income leads consumers
to choose higher emissions vehicles by the same scal-
ing parameter. The effectiveness of a fuel tax, since it is
very similar to a registration tax proportional to emis-
sions, is explored in the SI, however since when
including fuel costs in consumer decisions, this tax is
expressed in terms of a smaller component of the total
operating cost, the effectiveness value obtained is pro-
portionally smaller18.
Finally, long term impacts of ﬁscal policies sup-
porting low carbon engine technologies at low levels of
diffusion is difﬁcult to carry out using this short term
analysis: it requires modelling diffusion dynamics.
Here we ﬁnd however that in the short term, emissions
were not always reduced in the model when
subsidising the purchase of hybrid cars since the policy
may actually lead consumers to replace low carbon
petrol and diesel vehicles by higher emissions hybrids.
This depends strongly on the speciﬁc details of the pol-
icy, which needs more careful study. Meanwhile, sub-
sidising electric cars in all cases decreases emissions,
but by amounts orders of magnitude lower than the
values of table 2 in which all types of vehicles are
involved.
4.Discussion
4.1.Distributions
We observe that the structures of vehicle markets are
widely different across countries. Within developed
nations, while the price distribution in the UK is
comparable to that of the USA, the distribution in
Japan is lower and narrower. For the emerging
nations, in India and Brazil the distributions are
narrow and similar to that of Japan, while the
distribution in China is broad, comparable to that in
the UK. This is likely related to income distribution,
culture and social dynamics within those societies.
These variations do not have any clear relationship to
Figure 5.Populationweighted univariate regressions between variables for India, Japan andBrazil. Left column: engine sizes against
the logarithmof vehicle prices.Middle column: emissions against engine sizes.Right column: emissions against the logarithmof vehicle
prices. In the case of Brazil,ﬂex indicates cars that can use either petrol or ethanol.
18
I.e. this only means that a doubling of the price of fuels has a
smaller effectiveness than a tax of which the fee results in a doubling
of the average price of the vehicles.
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GINI coefﬁcients for these countries or othermeasures
of inequality19.
We also ﬁnd disparities between distributions of
engine sizes across nations, seemingly unrelated to any
particular physical or geographical features or con-
straints. These are unrelated to differences in price dis-
tributions. For example, despite similar price
distributions in the UK and the USA, the distribution
Table 2. (Top table) Table of correlation parameters, of the form y ax b= + , calculated using the data ofﬁgures 4 and 5.Units are in (a1)
(cc = cubic centimetres, L = litres) cc / log P, (b2) cc, (a3) gCO2 km
−1 L−1, (b4) gCO2 km
−1, (a5) gCO2 km
−1/log P and (b6) gCO2 km
−1.R2
indicates coefﬁcients of determination expressing the strengths of the correlations. Uncertainty values for correlation parameters were
obtained usingMonte-Carlo analysis, described in the SI. (Bottom table) Calculated values for the effectiveness of taxes on either rated
emission or engine sizes are given, with their aggregate impacts on both rated emissions and engine sizes for new potential ﬂeet-years. These
are calculated using equations 5 and 6, i.e. emissions or engine size reductions expected for 100% tax applied (see calculation details with
examples in the SI). Uncertainty ranges correspond to the standard deviations of variations in individual consumer choices with respect to
themeans. They should not be interpreted strictly as uncertainty values on themeans, since signiﬁcant amounts of variations in consumer
choices cancel out in the aggregate, evenwhen their variations are signiﬁcant.
Correlation parameters
Engine size versus log price Emissions versus engine size Emissions versus log price
a1 b2 R2 a3 b4 R2 a5 b6 R2
UK Petrol 1145 −9581 0.73 48.87 61.3 0.84 60.8 −453.2 0.71
Diesel 1118 −9395 0.74 50.6 33.9 0.52 65.1 −527.5 0.50
Hybrid 1605 −14314 0.85 31.2 39.2 0.67 52.0 −427.3 0.63
All 1089±76 −9072± 785 0.76 40± 4 64± 6 0.56 43± 6 −314± 57 0.42
USA Petrol 1755 −14747 0.15 35.2 90.2 0.53 72.7 −545.2 0.26
Hybrid 1868 −16929 0.84 39.5 50.7 0.93 85.6 −738.0 0.84
All 1751± 333 −14742
± 3357
0.13 36± 9 87± 21 0.54 73± 21 −545± 207 0.23
China Petrol 333 −1578 0.32 43.8 84.6 0.40 17.9 −17.6 0.17
Diesel 259 −623 0.31 97.9 −19.2 0.31 36.2 −148.9 0.14
Hybrid 456 −2976 0.05 23.7 51.6 0.40 −44.6 573.4 0.42
All 331± 120 −1560± 1178 0.32 43± 11 84± 21 0.40 18± 7 −66± 67 0.17
India Petrol 673 −4847 0.91 21.3 121.0 0.27 19.6 −29.2 0.29
Diesel 794 −5796 0.63 26.9 120.2 0.40 31.9 −131.8 0.52
All 790± 273 −5828± 2455 0.75 28± 25 116± 39 0.40 30± 24 −114± 218 0.45
Japan Petrol 1308 −11466 0.84 47.8 67.2 0.78 56.7 −422.4 0.55
Hybrid 1286 −11098 0.58 47.8 4.5 0.72 74.4 −653.8 0.75
All 1333± 210 −11693
± 2051
0.84 41± 14 67± 14 0.67 50± 20 −349± /87 0.49
Brazil Petrol 887 −7130 0.62 17.2 118.8 0.31 33.6 −194.6 0.41
Flex fuel 838 −6777 0.60 32.4 68.1 0.36 33.1 −211.6 0.37
All 964± 187 −7980± 1875 0.84 35± 18 67± 24 0.73 42± 16 −328± 157 0.76
Tax effectiveness
E
Tln
Δ
and
S
Tln
Δ
Tax on emissions
Emissions reductions (in gCO2 km
−1) Engine size reductions (in cc)
.05σ = 0.1σ = 0.2σ = 0.05σ = 0.1σ = 0.2σ =
UK 32± 15 32± 11 31 ± 8 781± 157 780± 118 775± 92
USA 93± 52 82± 42 64 ± 30 2128± 673 1941± 552 1465± 406
China 25± 22 25± 19 21 ± 14 327± 231 294± 214 263± 167
India 38± 57 37± 48 32 ± 36 717± 389 637± 331 549± 261
Japan 26± 39 34± 28 35 ± 18 859± 384 874± 278 884± 222
Brazil 33 ± 86 32± 69 26 ± 32 820± 902 748± 746 584± 381
Tax on engine size
UK 33± 12 33± 9 33 ±8 858± 139 861± 112 870± 103
USA 83± 56 78± 44 64 ± 32 2361± 745 2156± 613 1682± 460
China 25± 25 23± 19 21 ± 12 265± 263 276± 211 302± 148
India 26± 93 22± 67 17 ± 45 781± 664 731± 475 623± 347
Japan 26± 42 36± 26 38 ± 23 1155± 470 1208± 318 1206± 302
Brazil 34 ± 77 35± 60 29 ± 32 965± 850 834± 656 658± 374
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While a relationship with income distribution apparently exists
(as suggested by ﬁgure 1), the relationship with inequality is likely
more complex.
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of engine sizes in the USA covers 1000–6000cc, while
that of the UK is concentrated between 1000 and
3000cc.
We ﬁnd similar disparities across countries in the
distributions of rated emissions. Cars in the USA have
the broadest emissions distribution, while Brazil and
India have the narrowest, followed by the UK and
Japan. The USA has the highest average and median
emissions, while Brazil and Japan have the lowest. The
upper end of the emissions distribution in the USA has
a value of almost twice that in Brazil or India, and 50%
higher than the UK and Japan. These market structure
differences are identiﬁed as tied to cultural and beha-
vioural characteristics of consumers, but also tied to
their regulatory and tax history (including fuel taxes,
which aremarkedly lower in theUSA).
Price distributions of alternative technologies are
also very different across countries. The UK is the
nation with the widest choice for hybrid cars while it is
the USA for electric cars. Japan sees the highest market
penetration in absolute numbers for both, however
these cover only about the upper half of the price
range. The availability and penetration of alternative
technologies in emerging nations is very low, and in
India and Brazil the price of hybrid vehicles is prohibi-
tively higher than what people spend on vehicles. This
means that in the USA and the UK, most consumers
can access an alternative vehicle technology in price
ranges near what they are willing to pay for a vehicle.
Meanwhile this is not the case in emerging countries
where the market coverage of these technologies is
very patchy. Japan is in an intermediate situation. This
limits highly the effectiveness of alternative technology
support policies such as subsidies.
The emissions distributions of hybrid vehicles
have lower averages than those of ICE vehicles. How-
ever their emissions are not always lower than the
ﬂeet-year averages, where for example in the USA,
many hybrid vehicles have higher emissions thanmost
petrol cars. A similar observation can be made about
Japan and theUK. As the availability of technologies in
these countries is comparatively high, this feature cor-
relates with the fact that emissions of hybrid vehicles
sold to consumers purchasing in large engine size
brackets are higher than emissions of any vehicles in
lower engine power brackets; however emissions of
high power hybrids are still lower than those of the
vehicles they most likely replace in the same price or
engine size brackets. It suggests that subsidising hybrid
vehicles can lead to increased emissions.
4.2. Correlations andpolicy effectiveness
Correlations between emissions and engine sizes exist
in all countries, and this is due to this relationship
being mostly an engineering one (ﬁgures 4 and 5,
middle panels, and table 2, middle columns), where
larger engines are more powerful, use more energy
(fuel) and therefore produce higher emissions per
distance driven. The parameters of these correlations
are similar but differ across countries, and this may be
related to either or both: (1) additional features
coming with higher power vehicles that also use
energy, of which the purchase differ between coun-
tries, or (2) different levels of technology sophistica-
tion in vehicles leading to varying levels of fuel
efﬁciency at similar engine sizes.
However, correlations do not always exist between
prices and engine sizes (or power, left panels). Their
strength (the R2 parameters), when they exist, vary con-
siderably between countries. In particular, while a very
clear log-linear relationship exists in the UK, India, Japan
andBrazil, the relationships are veryweak in theUSAand
China. This indicates a clear hierarchy between engine
size and prices in vehicle markets in the UK, India, Japan
andBrazil, but none in theUSAorChina. It thus emerges
that in China and the USA, the size of the engine is not a
major determinant of the price in manufacturer market-
ingdecisions,while it is elsewhere.
Depending whether relationships exist between pri-
ces and engine sizes, the existing relationships between
emissions and engine sizes bridges to possible relation-
ships between emissions and prices, although with
weaker correlations than with engine sizes. Thus, wher-
ever relationships exist between engine sizes and prices,
they exist between emissions and prices, and conversely
where they don’t exist. Thus very weak relationships exist
between emissions and prices in the USA and China,
while they are stronger inother countries.
The scaling parameters of these relationships
(table 2) indicate the likely consumer response to ﬁscal
policy in these countries, with a conﬁdence measure
given by R2. However, we consider that more reliable
values, along with measures of variations in consumer
behaviour, are given by using the average effectiveness
of policy per average unit tax paid determined using
equations 5 and 6. According to these, one expects a
high response to policy of 0.6–0.9 gCO2 km
−1 per per-
cent of average tax in the USA (60–90 gCO2 km
−1 for
100% tax), indicating a very high abatement potential
with moderate tax values. Meanwhile in all other
countries, the ﬂeet-year-average effectiveness lies in
the area of 0.3–0.4 gCO2 km
−1 per percent of average
tax. These values agree with those obtained with
regressions. It has been suggested that indirect emis-
sions taxes based on engine sizes are less efﬁcient at
reducing emissions than direct taxes (He and Bandiva-
dekar 2011). From the consumer choice perspective,
this is not supported by our data, where little differ-
ence is observed in aggregate between the two tax
schemes. Therefore, this assertion is likely to be only
true from the supplier perspective, where manu-
facturers are likely to attempt to circumvent engine
size-based taxes by designing vehicles with smaller
engines for the same amount of power (e.g. with
turbo-chargers).
Negative tax values also lead to increases in emis-
sions by the same factors, suggesting that relative
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consumer income increases lead to increasing emis-
sions. This can explain current trends of increase in
engine sizes in the UK20, Ireland (Gallachoir
et al 2009) and Germany (Zachariadis 2013). Finally,
the effectiveness of taxes are orders of magnitude
higher in the short term than those obtained when
policy only supports the diffusion of alternative engine
technologies with subsidies.
5. Conclusion andpolicy implications
The data and analysis presented in this paper has clear
policy implications. We have provided qualitative and
quantitative tools that can help understand and
determine the likely outcome of chosen policies
targeting consumer vehicle choice for emissions
reductions. We ﬁnd that it is possible to calculate
average values for the effectiveness of ﬁscal policies
using market data, and the results differ by country
analysed. Our data show a high diversity of consumer
choices, tied to socio-economic differences, different
in every country, with repercussions on ﬂeet-year
emissions and prospects for reductions.
The effectiveness of ﬁscal policies for incentivising
consumer choices towards lower emissions vehicles of
any type, according to this work, is of around 0.3–0.4
gCO2 km
−1 per percent of a proportional emissions
tax applied to vehicle sale prices, in all countries except
in the USA where it is of 0.6–0.9 gCO km−1 per per-
cent of tax, 2 to 3 times higher, with higher uncer-
tainty. Taxes based on either emissions or engine sizes
have similar impacts. However, using on their own
policies to support the diffusion of new engine tech-
nologies, given our model of consumer choice, has an
effectiveness orders of magnitude lower than tax poli-
cies that apply to all types of vehicles simultaneously.
Fuel taxes, while reducing transport use, have a similar
effect on vehicle choices; however since they only
apply to a minor component of total costs, they result
in a lower impact. These values, however, apply only in
the short term. In the long term, the choice of con-
sumers will inﬂuence manufacturer marketing strat-
egy, which will alter the range of vehicles offered to
consumers, which will in turn again alter consumer
choices, and policy will need to be re-assessed over
time. The complex co-evolutionary process between
consumer choices, manufacturer strategy and policy-
making is a subject that requires further research.
We conclude that both the stringency and the
structure of policies are important. Fiscal policies
based on emissions are essential to reduce ﬂeet-year
emissions across the range of consumer groups; poli-
cies supporting changes in engine types are not likely
highly effective in the short term, and this is due to a
patchy market coverage by hybrid and electric vehi-
cles. Meanwhile, we show that ﬁscal policies following
the ‘polluter pays’ principle generate an incentive that
decreases with consumer income. If, in order to com-
pletely decarbonise private transport (e.g. the UK’s
2050 target), policy strategy is to transform themarket
towards a dominance of alternative technologies,
comprehensive technology demand pull and supply
push policies must be used in close collaboration with
manufacturers, which may yield positive results in the
long term. However, both emissions-based ﬁscal poli-
cies and technology policies must be used simulta-
neously in order to reduce emissions in both the short
and the long term.
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